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The Concept of Possession in Commercial
Transactions: Chasing The Quick-Brown Fox
JAMES S. CURTIN*
INTRODUCTION
First year law students have traditionally struggled to understand
the concepts of possession and relativity of title. In attempting to
understand or explain these concepts both student and teacher
must recognize their significance as the foundation of property law.
Such a recognition is essential to dealing with the underlying prob-
lem of property law: reconciling the tension between the "true
owner"' of property and the buyer in the chain of commerce.
Cases, typical to first year property courses,2 will be discussed in
a narrative fashion that presents an overview in contrast to isolated
points of law. The cases all involve questions of title to tangible
personal property.3 The article begins with a theoretical discussion
of the acquisition and transfer of title and proceeds to an analysis
of the derivative concept of relativity of title as a means for resolving
conflicting claims of ownership. Finally, some basic principles are
considered as devices designed to inject commercial reality into the
static concepts of possession and relativity of title.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law; A.B., Duquesne
University, 1959; M.B.A., University of Pennsylvania (Wharton), 1965; J.D., Duquesne
University, 1970; LL.M., Harvard University, 1975.
1. The "true owner" may be only a person with a claim more legitimate than the current
possessor of the item. As developed more fully herein, the legitimacy of his title arises from
an earlier possession. The real true owner, the person who has an unassailable right to the
item, may never appear. In describing the theoretical basis for dealing with claims arising at
or between any points on a chain of title, the person claiming the oldest legitimate title has
been designated by the author as the "true owner."
2. The cases discussed in this article are taken primarily from J. CRIBET & C. JOHNSON,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY (4th ed. 1978). The order in which the cases are presented,
however, differs from the sequence in the book.
3. Such staples of the basic property course as estates in land and future interests, having
been discussed superbly elsewhere, are not discussed here. See, e.g., C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUC-
TION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1962); T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN
LAND AND FurURE INTERESTS (1966); L. SiMEs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (2d
ed. 1966).
Title to intangible personal property is not discussed here, for by virtue of historical acci-
dent, the intangibles most important today-stocks, bonds, and negotiable instruments-
were not matters of concern during the era in which basic property law took its shape.
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THE CONCEPT OF POSSESSION
Prior Possession as the Genesis of Title
Property courses have traditionally begun with a discussion of the
"wild animal" cases.' Since questions regarding the ownership of
freshly-captured wild animals infrequently arise in the commercial
context, the rationale for studying these old cases is sometimes
questioned. The concept of possession as the basis of ownership is
clearly demonstrated by these cases; therefore, their study is neces-
sary even though the limits of their commercial utility are recog-
nized.
The most famous wild animal case is Pierson v. Post,5 a dispute
over the ownership of a dead fox. Post and his hounds, chasing a fox,
were on the verge of killing it, when Pierson burst upon the scene,
slew the fox, and ran off with the body. In the ensuing litigation,
both Pierson and Post argued that he had first possession and, con-
sequently, ownership. Both lawyers and judges, assuming that one
of the claimants was the owner, haggled over a fact question: how
much possession of the fox was "real" possession sufficient to make
one or the other party the owner. It takes no legal training to realize
that if possession can be established other than by actually holding
the fox by the scruff of the neck, as the Pierson court assumed, there
are virtually no standards to guide judicial decision.
From a teaching standpoint, Pierson is remarkable for its two-
dimensional fact situation. The fox had no prior owner.' The issue
of ownership was limited to a determination of title between two
people, both with an arguable claim to original possession. Post
based his claim on his pursuit of the fox; however, Pierson, as the
first to have the fox in hand, won. Having neither deprived the fox
of its natural liberty nor prevented Pierson's capture of the fox, Post
could not establish that he had possession prior to Pierson.
Post had an arguable possession in the actual case. Assume, how-
ever, a variation where Post is not in pursuit of the fox when Pierson
catches it. Post claims no prior contact with the fox but sues to
acquire it. He claims ownership but has no semblance of possession,
either prior to or at the time of suit. A reading of Pierson convinces
4. Pierson v. Post, 3 Caines 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1805), and Young v. Hichens, 115
Eng. Rep. 228 (Q.B. 1844), are two such cases which can be considered as staple to the
introductory property course.
5. 3 Caines 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1805).
6. As the Pierson court noted, the fox was an animal ferae naturae and belonged to no
one. Id. at 175, 2 Am. Dec. at 264. Most things in nature "belong" to the ground on which
they are attached and, therefore, are owned by the person owning the land. Animals, moving
across the land, have no such true owner.
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us that Post now has neither a winning case nor an arguable claim.
A semblance of possession, however arguable, must be present to
support any claim of title.
When Pierson was argued, the fundamental importance of posses-
sion in the law of property was not a variable; it is not a variable
now. But what facts must coincide to support one's assertion of
possession is the subject of constant debate. Possession, as each
party in Pierson conceded, is of utmost importance. It is the starting
point of those rights which are called title.
What is important about Pierson is easily overlooked. There is an
almost unspoken assumption among the parties and the judges that
whoever had first possession of the fox was its owner and was enti-
tled to continue that possession for as long as he saw fit. Another
variation on the two-dimensional hypothetical confirms that the
right of title belongs to the earlier possessor and is not defeated by
his relinquishing actual possession for a limited purpose.
Assume that Pierson captured the fox but did not kill it. Having
defeated Post's claim in the litigation, Pierson takes the fox to
Brown, the veterinarian, for treatment. Brown takes the fox but
refuses to return it to Pierson. Pierson clearly had possession prior
to Brown but Brown has possession now. This hypothetical elimi-
nates the fact situation upon which the original case turned; in this
variant, both claimants had actual possession at some point. As a
matter of law, will earlier or later possession prevail? Is Pierson's
conditional relinquishment a decisive factor?
These were precisely the issues in Armory v. Delamirie.7 A chim-
ney sweep there found a piece of jewelry which he took to a gold-
smith for appraisal. The smith removed and retained gemstones
from the jewelry and refused to return them to the sweep. The latter
then brought suit to recover their value. As between a prior and
subsequent possessor, Armory makes clear what Pierson suggests:
where both parties have actual possession at some time, it is prior
possession that gives a right of ownership.
Armory also establishes that the right of the prior possessor in-
cludes the right to retain possession until freely and unconditionally
transferred. The right to voluntarily surrender possession for a lim-
ited purpose and later enforce the limitation in a court of law is
implicitly recognized.' In the Armory case, the sweep prevailed over
7. 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722).
8. Possession for a limited time and purpose which is consistent with the rights of the true
owner is the substance of the law of bailments. Generally a consensual or contractual arrange-
ment, some cases which deviate from the possession and relativity theory to award possession
to the owner of the place where the item was found do so on a theory of constructive bailment.
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the goldsmith; similarly, Pierson would recover the fox from Brown.
In determining ownership between two claimants, it is possession,
but more particularly prior possession not voluntarily or completely
relinquished, that determines the rights of parties before the court.
Relativity of Title
Prior possession and the conditions of its loss are important fac-
tors in determining title between successive possessors. An evalua-
tion of the possession theory as a commercial proposition must rec-
ognize that trade in commerce frequently involves sequential trans-
fer of possession throughout the life of the goods. Therefore, the
determination of rights between non-successive possessors must be
as predictable as that between successive possessors.
Assume that the fox in Pierson was really the pet9 of Quick. Pier-
son captured the fox and took him to Brown for treatment. When
Brown refused to return the fox, Pierson sought to recover the ani-
mal by filing suit. Quick, like the loser of the jewels in Armory, was
not made a party to the proceeding because his identity was not
known. It is implicit from Pierson and Armory that Quick may have
title to the fox based on his earlier possession. If any person had
possession of the fox prior to Quick, he could also claim ownership. 0
Requiring a determination of the rights of all possible claimants
would present innumerable obstacles to the person seeking to estab-
lish his own right to possession. The elimination of this problem is
achieved in the doctrine of relativity of title.
If the first basic concept of property is the primacy of possession,
the second concept, by which the courts deal with myriad claim-
ants, is relativity of title. Whether perceived as a doctrine of judicial
restraint or as an independent principle for determining rights, the
same result is achieved. The concept of relativity of title holds that
the court need only determine the merit of claims of parties before
it. This can easily be done by applying the first concept; prior pos-
session wins unless relinquished unconditionally. In Armory, the
court did not have to determine true ownership. The sweep prevails
over the smith even though it is clear that the former is a mere
See, e.g., Shamrock Hilton Hotel v. Caranas, 488 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972), McAvoy
v. Medina, 11 Allen 548, 87 Am. Dec. 733 (Mass. 1866). For a discussion of the result of
holding property in a manner which is inconsistent with the true owner's rights, see text
accompanying notes 32 through 35 infra.
9. An escaped wild animal returns to its unowned status. Assume for discussion purposes,
however, that Quick is still the true owner of the fox in spite of its momentary escape from
captivity.
10. Although not factually present here, this person would stand as true owner in relation
to Brown, Pierson or even Quick. See note 1 supra.
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"finder" and that a prior possessor whose claim predates all others
looms somewhere. Similarly, Pierson would still prevail over
Brown."
By logical extension of the relativity concept, Pierson should pre-
vail over Brown even though Quick is identified as a prior possessor
so long as Quick is not a party before the court. The idea is logically
correct if somewhat disconcerting. Anderson v. Gouldberg demon-
strates the operation of the concept of relativity of title in this con-
text. Defendant Gouldberg took and sold logs which plaintiff Ander-
son had cut and brought to a mill for processing. Because Anderson
had not consented to Gouldberg's action, he brought a suit to re-
cover possession of the logs. In defense, Gouldberg argued that the
logs were wrongfully taken by Anderson from an identifiable and
unconsenting true owner. Gouldberg asserted that Anderson's
claim, being defective against a known true owner, must also be
defective against the subsequent possessor. The logic of Armory
compelled the court to reject this contention and find for the plain-
tiff. Anderson's possession established "good title against all the
world except those having better title."'"
Pierson, Armory, and Anderson demonstrate the operation of the
principles of possession and relative title as the basis of property
rights. Pierson demonstrates that the prior possessor prevails when
only a single adverse claimant exists. Armory holds that prior pos-
session is superior until voluntarily and completely relinquished
even though an unindentified third party has rights superior to
those of either litigant. Finally, Anderson announces that the prior
possessor prevails even in the face of better rights of a known third
person, not in court to assert his title.
11. Not all courts award possession to the relatively earlier possessor who is before them.
In McAvoy v Medina, 11 Allen 548, 87 Am. Dec. 733 (Mass. 1866), the barber in whose shop
a purse was found prevailed over the customer who had found and had first possession of it.
The barber had been given the purse by the customer for the purpose of advertising for the
true owner. Since the true owner failed to reclaim it, the customer sought to recover the purse
from the barber.
If abandoning the relativity of title concept, the court ventures from the relatively objective
chore of determining earlier possession among the claimants before it to the more subjective
task of determining the true owner's mental state when he relinquished possession. While true
to the possession theory in its concern for the true owner, the court must first presume the
actual existence of this stranger whose rights should prevail over those of the parties. Even
assuming this person's existence, the reliability of this approach is complicated by the ab-
sence of the very party who could shed the most light on the subject of the inquiry.
12. 51 Minn. 294, 53 N.W. 636 (1892).
13. Id. at 296, 53 N.W. at 637.
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Enter the "True Owner"
The difficulty in applying the concept of possession and relativity
of title to commercial transactions arises when a prior possessor with
a legitimate claim" to the property, such as Quick, seeks to recover
the goods. Explicit in Armory and implicit in Anderson is the idea
that Pierson, although he defeated Brown, would have to return the
fox to Quick should the latter decide to file suit. Such a result would
be totally consistent with the logic of possession and relativity.
Another variation on this theme might involve a suit by Quick
against Brown. Assume that Brown still had the fox in his clinic
when Quick spotted his pet. Having papers to prove ownership,'5
Quick demanded the return of his pet. Brown refused and Quick
filed suit." It is consistent with the theory of possession and relative
title that Quick wins even though there is an intermediate possessor.
Goddard v. Winchell' illustrates the logical extension of the pos-
session theory to cases where the true owner asserts his rights under
such circumstances. The court there was called upon to determine
the rights of Goddard, the owner of land upon which a meteorite fell,
and Winchell, the person who bought the meteorite from Hoag-
land, who dug it up with Goddard's consent. Upon determining
that the meteorite was part of the land, and therefore originally in
the landowner's possession, the court quickly found for Goddard.
The resolution in Goddard is an elaboration on the theme in
Anderson. Anderson affirms that a prior possessor's rights are good
against all the world except those having better title in themselves.
Each claim rests on its own merit, not on the weakness of the com-
peting claim. Goddard adds a corollary-that the possessor's rights
rise no higher than the rights of his transferor. The possessor in-
herits the weaknesses of his transferor's claim. Just as Goddard re-
covered from Winchell, Quick would recover from Brown. The true
owner in Anderson could recover possession from whomever had the
logs-Anderson or Gouldberg. The existence of intervening posses-
sors in the chain of title is not significant to the theoretical applica-
tion of these doctrines in this context. The hierarchical system of
ownership based on prior possession and the recognition of the rela-
14. See note 1 supra. The source of this legitimate claim is, of course, the absence of
voluntary and complete relinquishment of his right to possession.
15. Papers are not necessary to the proof of ownership but are merely evidence of the
owner's title.
16. For purposes of illustrating a cause of action between non-successive possessors, Pier-
son is not joined as a party. In applying the doctrine of relativity of title, his joinder is not
necessary to the resolution of the suit. If he were joined, he too would lose to Quick.
17. 86 Iowa 71, 52 N.W. 1124 (1892).
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tively better titles of the parties before the court has been carried
to its logical extreme.
COMMERCIAL LIMITS To POSSESSION THEORY
The result in Goddard pinpoints the problem with actualizing the
possession theory. Winchell bought the meteorite from Hoagland,
yet he had to relinquish his possession to the rightful claimant God-
dard. This is, in the hypothetical, the same problem that Brown
would have had if, instead of merely taking the fox for treatment,
he had purchased it from Pierson. If the true owner can reclaim the
goods from subsequent possessors, including those who purchase the
goods from their transferor, as the extension of the possession theory
allows, then the rule of law is "buyer beware" indeed. Strict appli-
cation of the possession theory deprives a buyer of absolute security
of title. This lack of security permeates relations between both suc-
cessive and non-successive possessors. Protection of a buyer against
superior claims is the essense of the commercial issue.
Predictability of title is obviously a necessity in the commercial
arena. A buyer's receipt of an unfettered title facilitates commercial
transactions.18 The concept of prior possession and relativity of title,
reasonable in the abstract, precludes this result under some circum-
stances. On the other hand, if the buyer can prevail over the true
owner, a new theoretical basis for title must be found. The only
justification for a rule favoring the buyer is commercial expediency.
At one time, the English courts, dealing with sales of personal
property, favored the concept of market overt; the buyer in regular
channels of commerce obtained absolute title. The United States
tends to adhere to the possession theory more closely, despite its
anti-commercial characteristics. The buyer, however, is not without
some protection. The doctrines of adverse possession, bona fide pur-
chaser, and warranty mitigate the harshness flowing from strict
application of the possession theory 9 and approximate the market
overt concept.
Self-Protection-Getting All
The Title Your Seller Has
The buyer of personal property can protect himself against later
claims of his immediate transferor. If a buyer's rights rise no higher
18. At the least, the buyer should not pay for more title than he is actually receiving.
19. All of the doctrines to be discussed herein protect the buyer from true owner claims.
One of the protective devices, adverse possession, does not depend on the exchange of consid-
eration. Donees, takers, and defrauders can acquire a title superior to the true owner through
adverse possession. See text accompanying notes 28 through 35 infra.
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than those of his seller, it is important to get whatever rights his
seller has to give.I If the transferor is the true owner, the sufficiency
of the buyer's title against all claimants is established. If his trans-
feror is not the true owner, it is necessary to take adequate steps to
defeat the transferor's possible claims although title sufficient to
defeat all other possible claimants cannot be had from the trans-
feror. The possession theory supports the implication that complete
and voluntary relinquishment of possession will extinguish the
rights of a prior possessor. This is the case. It is apparent that the
relinquishment must be in favor of the subsequent possessor if the
latter is to establish that he has what the former had. The means
for accomplishing this transfer developed in the law of gifts. By
analyzing the requirement for an effective transfer in the gift con-
text, one can also understand the mechanics of a transfer for sale."
Delivery of the goods coupled with the intention of the owner that
the transferee become the owner is the major prerequisite for an
effective gift.2 Just as possession is established in the ownership
cases, the issues of delivery and intent are resolved as fact questions.
Possession of the item is strong evidence that the donor intended
to part with the property; however, possession alone is not sufficient
to establish an effective transfer. By requiring that delivery and
intent coincide, the law precludes a transfer of title where the trans-
feror did not intend the taker to have a present interest in the
property.2 Delivery must also be as complete as possible under the
circumstances. When the goods and circumstances indicate that an
actual transfer from one party to another is reasonably convenient,
the law will require such an act. The doner's intent, in such circum-
stances, will not control even though clearly proved. From an objec-
20. The buyer may not be able to ascertain what the seller's title actually is but the
importance of getting all of it should be clear. The best means of avoiding the risk to which
the buyer is exposed if the seller is not the true owner (or the owner of what he is purporting
to sell) is to get the seller's warranty. If his title later proves defective, the buyer has an
enforceable promise by which he can recover. See text accompanying notes 46 through 48
infra.
21. It may be that at one time every transfer of title was, legally, a gift. Because the
donative transfer lacks consideration, upholding a transfer where none was intended would
clearly leave the true owner uncompensated. The requirements for an effective transfer are
therefore most stringent in the area of gifts.
22. The donee must also accept the gift.
23. See In re Estate of Evans, 467 Pa. 36, 356 A.2d 778 (1976). The true owner gave the
donee keys to his safe-deposit box with the understanding that the donee could have the
contents. After the donor's death, his heirs claimed the $800,000 found in the box. The court
did not uphold the gift. Transfer of the keys alone was not sufficient. In spite of a clearly
expressed donative intention, the lack of actual delivery with a present intent to relinquish
title defeated the donee's claim. The gift of the keys was insufficient, the court intimated,
because without an alternation of the bank's signature card, the keys would not enable their
possessor to get access to the contents of the box.
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tive point of view, the item must pass from the owner's posses-
sion-from his management, use, and control-with the clearly
shown intention that he relinquishes title completely, before the law
will recognize an effective transfer by gift.
In our hypothetical, a transfer of rights in the fox would not occur
by gift if Pierson said, "I'll give you the fox next week, Brown," and
immediately transferred possession. It would not be effective if Pier-
son were to say, "The fox is yours, Brown," but fail to relinquish
his possession. By failing to prove that the necessary elements coin-
cided, Brown could not prove ownership transferred by gift from
Pierson. He could not legitimately claim that he acquired all the
rights that Pierson had in the fox.
The passage of title in the sale of goods does not follow the strict
requirement that delivery and intent coincide. This reflects a com-
mercial consideration equal in importance to obtaining title from
the seller: the allocation of the risk of loss between the time of
contracting and delivery. As a general rule, passage of title, and
hence passage of the risk of loss, depends upon the intention of the
parties.2' The contract of sale may transfer title to the goods even
though delivery has not yet occurred. This flexibility, however, does
not imply an abandonment of the delivery concept.
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code can control rights,
obligations, and remedies in relation to the sale of goods irrespective
of the title of goods." Yet, when title does become a material issue,
"title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller
completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery
of the goods, ' 26 unless the parties explicitly agree otherwise. In ab-
sence of mutual agreement, the common law requirement of deliv-
ery remains as the standard.
Judicial Intervention
If the seller delivers goods with the intention of completely trans-
ferring his rights, clearly the purchaser acquires all the title which
his transferor had.27 The seller's rights may be deficient; there may
be a prior possessor whose rights are paramount to the seller's and,
24. U.C.C. § 2-401(1).
25. Id., comment.
26. U.C.C. § 2-401(2) (emphasis added). This is true even though the seller reserves a
security interest or the document of title is to be delivered elswhere.
27. The U.C.C. codifies the common law bona fide purchaser concept, U.C.C. § 2-403(1).
The U.C.C. further codifies a related concept by estopping a true owner from asserting his
title against a purchaser who in the ordinary course of business bought the goods from a
merchant in whose possession the true owner allowed them to remain. U.C.C. § 2-403(2),
U.C.C. § 2-403(3).
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therefore, to the buyer's. This possibility presents a real threat to
the security of the purchaser's title yet he is powerless to do anymore
on his own to ascertain the quality of his claim. It is at this point
that the judicial system tempers the basic possession theory in the
name of protecting a buyer of goods from a hidden true owner.
Adverse Possession
A prior possessor preserves the right to recover possession from a
subsequent holder by conditioning his relinquishment of possession.
The concept of adverse possession introduces the requirement that
the prior possessor who has involuntarily relinquished possession
must take reasonably prompt steps to reacquire the property.
Chapin v. FreelandTM involved an action by plaintiff to recover
possession of two shop counters from defendant, who had repos-
sessed them without the plaintiff's consent. Defendant's claim origi-
nated from an earlier and apparently rightful ownership predating
that of the persons from whom the plaintiff had acquired the count-
ers. Since defendant's possession had preceeded that of the persons
on whom plaintiff's claim depended, and as defendant's prior relin-
quishment was involuntary, defendant should have prevailed had
the possession theory been applied.
Plaintiff, however, recovered the counters even though defendant
had actual possession and the appearance of a relatively better title.
Plaintiff prevailed because she and her predecessor 29 had possession
of the counters for 14 years prior to defendant's repossession. During
all of that period, defendant had made no claim to recover his goods.
Defendant's taking became wrongful conversion of the property
since his action occurred after the expiration of the six-year statute
of limitations. 30 Possession by a holder of goods31 will extinquish the
claims of even "true owners" once a fixed statutory period has
passed. Thus, plaintiff had an absolutely good title. Prior possessors
28. 142 Mass. 383, 8 N.E. 128 (1886).
29. "Tacking" permits subsequent adverse possessors to include the time 6f their prede-
cessors in meeting the statutory limit. If Pierson held the fox for three years adversely to
Quick and then sold it to Brown, Brown would need to hold the fox only three years to defeat
Quick. If Pierson held the fox three years and then Brown acquired the fox under circumstan-
ces independent of or adverse to Pierson's claim, Brown must hold the fox six years in his
own right to acquire title by adverse possession. See R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL
PRoPERTr § 4.3 (3d ed. 1975).
30. The period of limitation varies from state to state. The Massachusetts statute was a
six year term; Illinois has a five year limit, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 16 (1977).
31. As demonstrated in Chapin, adverse possession can also be claimed by a one-time
possessor who held for a sufficiently long period at some point in time. In other words,
completed adverse possession is good against the true owner should he physically regain
possession at a later date.
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have been defeated by the passage of time.
If mere possession over a particular period of time could always
defeat the person with relatively better title, the ability to relin-
quish actual possession for any lengthy period of time would be
severely curtailed. Suppose that Pierson, as possessor of the fox,
takes it to Brown for boarding while he goes on an extended vaca-
tion. He states that he will pick up the fox in eight years. Suppose
also that the statute of limitations perfected the title of an adverse
possessor after six years. If Brown could extinquish Pierson's title
after only six years, Pierson would be foolhardy to board the fox for
a greater period, regardless of his reasons.
In requiring that the subsequent possessor's claim be "adverse"
to the prior possessor's rights, the law has permitted the prior pos-
sessor to exercise his right of limited relinquishment without placing
his title in jeopardy. A subsequent possession becomes adverse only
when it becomes inconsistent with the prior possessor's relinquish-
ment.3 2 Where the prior possessor relinquishes involuntarily, that
period of adverse possession begins to run immediately. Where a
temporal condition is placed on the relinquishment, possession after
the stipulated time, without the owner's consent, is considered ad-
verse. In the hypothetical, Brown could not perfect his title until 14
years had passed. If Pierson fails to reclaim the fox after eight years33
and then takes no action to recover him within the next six years,
Pierson loses his rights by operation of law.3'
Application of the adverse possession doctrine is complicated by
instances in which the taker conceals his possession to thwart the
prior possessor- and by cases, like Chapin, where a succession of
adverse possessors are involved. The basic concept, however, is one
which is consistent with and complementary to the possession
theory of Pierson yet affords commercially expedient relief by de-
feating stale claims of prior possessors. Possession provides rights
against those who have not had possession. Possession provides
rights against those who have voluntarily and completely relin-
quished possession. Possession over a sufficient period of time will
32. See note 8 supra.
33. He could also extend the period. Brown's continued possession would be permissive
rather than hostile so that the statute would not begin to run.
34. Brown would not need to take formal steps to perfect his title.
35. The statute normally begins to run when the right to bring an action accrues, which
is when the property is found or taken. The inequity of rigorously applying such a rule is
obvious where the taker's concealment prevents the owner from finding his property. Whether
concealment is so serious as to necessitate suspending the running of the statute is a question
without a general answer. As a fact issue, it is a question to be answered on a case by case
basis. See R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 4.2 (3d ed. 1975).
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provide rights against those who did not voluntarily relinquish their
rights but failed to take prompt steps to locate the goods or assert
their rights. In a properly constructed transaction, the buyer is safe
from both his transferor's future claims and those of others who have
let the statute run.
The Buyer as a Bona Fide Purchaser
The adverse possession rule, while protecting the transaction from
stale claims, does nothing to protect the purchaser from claims of
more recent 3l rightful prior possessors. The doctrine of the bona fide
purchaser provides some protection to the buyer confronted by such
a claimant.
Assume that Quick had entrusted his fox to Pierson with the
understanding that Pierson would sell the fox and pay Quick some
time later. Suppose further that Pierson had misrepresented his
personal financial resources to induce such a sale on credit. If Pier-
son sold the fox to Brown and then disappeared without paying
Quick, should Quick be allowed to recover possession of the fox from
Brown?
In Phelps v. McQuade,37 the court determined that the third per-
son could not be successfully sued since the true owner did voluntar-
ily and completely,3 although misguidedly, surrender possession. In
the absence of evidence showing that he did not intend to transfer
his rights when he transferred possession, the true owner has no
further claim against the property or its ultimate possessor. Such a
conclusion is wholly consistent with the possession theory; such a
conclusion is unabashedly pro-commercial in affording protection to
the buyer. Applied relentlessly, however, it would also afford consid-
erable financial gain to defrauders such as our hypothetical Pier-
son. 39
36. These are the people against whom the statute of limitations has not run.
37. 220 N.Y. 232, 115 N.E. 441 (1917).
38. Lack of payment to the true owner does not normally defeat the inference that he
transferred his rights absolutely when he transferred possession. The law of security interests
(and real estate mortgages) is a response to the trouble caused by such an inference. It is
apparent from U.C.C. § 1-201(37) and U.C.C. § 9-107 that a seller on credit must "take" a
security interest in the property in order to retain a recourse to the property itself when the
buyer defaults. In the absence of a secured interest, the true owner must rely on an action in
contract against the buyer. If the buyer has sold the goods, the judgment on the contract can
only be satisfied by the buyer's assets; since the assets no longer include the goods, the true
owner cannot recover the property.
39. This does not mean that the true owner has no cause of action against the deceiver.
If the deceiver can be found, a tort action for conversion or deceit may be brought. A judgment
for the true owner, however, would have to be satisfied from the deceiver's assets. These assets
no longer include the goods in question and the proceeds of the sale may have long been
dissipated.
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The difficulty seems to be in applying the law to the facts. A true
owner does not voluntarily relinquish his rights to a finder or a thief;
therefore, the finder or thief can acquire no title superior to that of
the original owner" to pass to a third party. Yet, one who obtains,
through guile, rights and possession from the willing but deceived
true owner acquires for himself and the subsequent possessor a
claim superior to that of the party beguiled. In the former case, the
true owner loses nothing; in the latter, he loses all even though his
intention, the decisive factor, was wrongfully induced. Must the
resolution involve such an "all or nothing" approach where fraud is
at issue?
The court in Phelps found an equitable middle road in the bona
fide purchaser doctrine. Where the transfer of possession was fraud-
ulently induced, the immediate transferee's rights are inferior to
that of the true owner. The transferee, along with anyone who subse-
quently takes from the transferee while knowing of the fraud, ac-
quires only a "voidable" title.4 In the hypothetical, Piers~n would
have such a title; Brown would also have one if he knew of the fraud
at the time he paid for and received the fox. In such circumstances,
Quick would be able to recover his fox from the party with posses-
sion.
When the defrauder transfers the goods to one who, not knowing
of the fraud, pays good value for the goods, the result changes. This
bona fide purchaser acquires a good title; against this person, the
victim of the deceit cannot assert true owner rights. Here is the
instance where one can transfer rights superior to one's own. In
having to choose between two innocent parties, equity follows the
law. The possession theory is adhered to because the original owner
transferred possession without clearly retaining rights in himself.
Here Brown could, by being an innocent purchaser for value, defeat
the claims of Quick. Similarly, those who took from Brown could
also defeat Quick's attempt to recover possession.
40. See text accompanying note 42 infra.
41. The mechanics through which the doctrine works itself out are inextricably tied to the
jurisdiction of the equity court. The law courts strictly apply the possession theory to bar
recovery of the goods by the true owner. To the extent that such a result is "inequitable,"
the equity court modifies the outcome. In deciding between a deceived true owner and his
deceiver (or one in cahoots with the deceiver), equity calls the latter claim voidable and
demands a return of the goods to the true owner. In deciding between the deceived true owner
and the bona fide purchaser, the legal position favoring the latter claim is fair and the equity
courts have not interfered with the law.
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Enforcing the Warranty-Help for the Bona Fide
Purchaser When the True Owner Wins
Adverse possession protects the possessor from earlier rights not
asserted within a statutorily determined time. The bona fide pur-
chaser doctrine protects the innocent purchaser against the true
owner who intended, through fraudulent inducement, to transfer his
rights. These doctrines afford much commercial security to the
buyer, but the buyer's security is only the result of some implied
acquiesence to the transfer of title42 or an actual but fraudulently
induced transfer of title.4 Where the court can find no transfer of
title by the owner, the purchaser will not prevail. Where the true
owner has not delivered his goods and title but rather has lost them,
had them stolen or has had them taken as a result of fraud so
fundamental as to amount to theft," then the finder, thief or defrau-
der acquires no legal title. Consequently, the purchaser acquires no
legal title because his seller had none to convey.
Such a result is consistent with the relationship between the true
owner and the purchaser as thus far developed. The law favors the
true owner. Where the true owner intended to transfer title, however
misguidedly, the law will give effect to the transfer. Equity will
intervene to restore the rights of the true owner when the choice is
between a misled true owner and a transferee who participated in
or knew of the fraud. Equity refuses to intervene where the choice
is between a misled transferor and an innocent purchaser. While
dealing with two innocents, the equity courts follow the law and
protect the purchaser since the true owner was in a better position
to prevent the fraud. Where the true owner had no intent to relin-
quish his rights, equity follows the law in protecting the true owner.
Thus, within a wide range of cases where the true owner had no
intent 45 to relinquish his rights, the bona fides of the purchaser will
be irrelevant to settling the dispute. In these cases where the true
owner can prevail, the buyer has only one place to look for redress.
42. This assumes that the true owner acquiesces to the loss of his title by failing to assert
his rights against the possessor whom he knows is holding the goods adversely to his owner-
ship.
43. Albeit that the transfer was wrongfully induced.
44. Fraud in the execution is an example. If the transfer involves circumstances where
the true owner does not know he is relinquishing his rights, his title will not pass. Cf., Phelps
v. McQuade, 220 N.Y. 232, 115 N.E. 441 (1917) (explaining how such a transaction could
occur).
45. U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2) and 2-403(3) contradict this in certain instances by giving effect
to a transfer even though the true owner had no intent to relinquish his rights. Where the
true owner entrusts to or acquiesces in the retention of his property by a merchant of goods
of that kind, he is estopped from denying a buyer's title if the merchant sells the goods to
the buyer in the ordinary course of business.
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He must go to the transferor who foisted bad title on him.
The Uniform Commercial Code provides that every contract for
the sale of goods" includes a warranty by the seller that he conveys
good title.47 Unless the warranty is modified or excluded by express
agreement," the buyer can, upon losing to the true owner, proceed
against his transferor for money damages. In terms of the hypotheti-
cal purchase of the fox, Brown can proceed on Pierson's warranty
and recover damages for his loss of possession. Pierson having no
prior transferor, bears the ultimate loss. This burden is commer-
cially reasonable for Pierson alone acquired more than he gave up
in the series of transfers. ' Having started with nothing, Pierson ends
up with nothing; having started with a fox or its purchase price,
Quick and Brown end up in the same position as they began. Such
a result provides an equitable resolution to the commercial applica-
tion of the possession theory.
CONCLUSION
The heart of the first year property course is the concept of owner-
ship based on prior possession. This concept, if rigorously applied,
makes the outcome of cases predictable within limits imposed by
the ambiguity of such terms as possession and delivery. Rigorous
adherence, however, creates uncertainty of ownership in some com-
mercial situations by favoring the true owner over the innocent
purchaser who paid valuable consideration for the goods. As a con-
sequence, there has been an orderly, if limited, modification of the
concept to facilitate the transfer of goods in commerce. For the first-
year student, an understanding of the concept of possession and its
pro-commercial modifications in the simple context of personal
property is a necessary first step toward grasping the further elabo-
rations which surround the law of real property.
46. A "contract for sale" includes both a present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods
at a future time. U.C.C. § 2-106(1).
47. U.C.C. § 2-312. Under the common law, there was no implied warranty of title. There
has been a progression from that position to the present rule which implies a warranty of title
unless such warranty is expressly excluded from a transaction. U.C.C. § 2-310; 2 A. SQumL-
LANTE & J. FONSECA, WLSTON ON SALES §§ 15-12 to 15-18 (4th ed. 1974).
48. A modification or exclusion may also be proved by showing circumstances which give
the buyer notice that the seller does not claim title or that he is only selling such rights as he
has. U.C.C. § 2-312(2).
49. If Brown wins as a bona fide purchaser, Quick can go against Pierson. See note 39
supra. The burden remains on Pierson regardless of the outcome of the Quick-Brown dispute.
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